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   Supervision as a risk for transparency?  
An explorative study of the Dutch system of youth care 
 
1. Introduction 
On 1st of January 2015 the New Dutch Act on Youth Care entered into force. One of the main 
problems of the system based on the previous Act on Youth Care was that it was highly frag-
mented and therefore not transparent. Main purpose of the introduction of the New Dutch Act on 
Youth Care was to provide for a system that was less complicated and therefore more efficient 
and effective.1 In order to achieve this goal, most powers were shifted to the municipalities. In-
terestingly enough, the explanatory memorandum states that the State is still responsible for the 
system, meaning that the State has to provide the necessary means to make sure the system is 
able to function.2 
By making the State responsible for the system, and posing obligations onto the municipalities, it 
seems the legislator wants to keep tabs on the municipalities. But the State has other options as 
well. The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment or the Minister of Security and Justice, 
depending on who is responsible, can also intervene based upon provisions in the Local Govern-
ment Act (in Dutch: Gemeentewet) if a municipality is not acting according to the law. But not 
only the municipalities are supervised; the actors in the field of Youth Care are also supervised. 
There are three different national inspectorates are supervising these actors: the Inspectorate of 
Public Order and Safety, the Inspectorate of Health Care and the Inspectorate for Youth Care. All 
three inspectorates have different responsibilities. For instance, the Inspectorate of Public Order 
and Safety is responsible for supervision of the implementation of decisions issued by criminal 
court whereas the Inspectorate of Health Care is responsible for the supervision of actors in the 
field of Health Care, including Youth Care.  
Do these measures hinder solving the problems of fragmentation, and therefore make it impossi-
ble to target issues of transparency? How does the system function? Which arrangements have 
                                                            
1 Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, p. 2. 
2 Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, p. 5. 
2 
 
been made in practice for supervision and accountability? The central question we aim to answer 
in this paper is: Does the new system of Youth Care provides for transparency? We combine ju-
dicial and social research methods. This allows us to analyse the system as intended and compare 
this with the actual working of the system.  
We start in section 2 with a review of literature in the field of public administration where we 
relate transparency to accountability. The assumption based on theory is that when responsibili-
ties are clearly defined, this enables responsible actors to be held accountable. Which, in turn, 
will increase transparency, since it is then clear who can be held accountable for what and by 
whom. Therefore the new introduced system of Youth Care can be considered transparent if it is 
clear who can be held accountable for what and by whom. We expect that the information on 
accountability follows clearly from the Act on Youth Care itself. If the Act on Youth Care how-
ever does not provide clarity on responsibilities of the actors, the goal of a transparent system 
could still be reached if the information on accountabilities is clear in practice.  
 
In section 3 we explain the legal system, as laid down in the Act on Youth Care. The legal analy-
sis shows that the Act states that both the State and the local authorities are responsible for youth 
care. This suggests blurred responsibilities, which could lead to confusion about accountability 
for the working of the system. However, responsibilities can also be clearly marked by work in-
structions on how to deal with the apparent diffuse responsibility.  
 
In section 4 we explore whether there is a clear distinction in responsibilities in the provision of 
Youth Care. In order to provide an answer to this, we have complemented our finding from desk 
and literature research, with interviews with civil servants within the Ministry of Security and 
Justice (S&J), the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (HWS), and three local authorities. 
Through the interviews, we can explore whether the responsibilities are clear in practice. This 
paper concludes in section 5 with some final remarks. 
 
2. Transparency through accountability  
The new Act on Youth Care was introduced to create a more transparent system, in which re-
sponsibilities are clearly defined. When responsibilities are clearly defined, this enables responsi-
ble actors to be held accountable. There seems to be an increasing concern for accountability, 
both in public administration literature and policy documents. As Bovens argues: “Accountability 
is one of those golden concepts that no one can be against. It is increasingly used in political dis-
course and policy documents because it conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness.”3 
However, is this image truthfully? In this paragraph, accountability and the relation between ac-
countability and transparency will be discussed. 
 
                                                            
3 Bovens, M. , 2007, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual framework, European Law Journal, 13 
(4), p. 448. 
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In order to find out if accountability can lead to transparency, we will need to study various as-
pects: who is held accountable, what are their accountabilities (what are they accountable for) and 
to whom are they accountable?  
 
There are various definitions of accountability, therefore it is necessary to first describe what we 
will be looking at. According to Bovens, ‘(a)ccountability is a relationship between an actor and a 
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum 
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.’4 Administrative 
accountability assumes civil servants are accountable towards the elected politicians. This can 
take place on one territorial level, but also between governmental levels, whereby for example 
the state can monitor processes and outcomes of lower governments. Since accountability implies 
that the subordinate will account for something that has taken place, it mostly takes place during 
policy implementation and evaluation. However, through accountability norms can be adjusted 
for future use, giving it also a prescriptive function.  
 
Bovens tries to discover why accountability receives so much attention. He unravels three rea-
sons: it provides democratic means to monitor and control government conduct, it prevents the 
development of concentrations of power, and it enhances the learning capacity and effectiveness 
of public administration.5 The first reason is connected to public accountability: ‘Each principal 
in the chain of delegation seeks to monitor the execution of the delegated public tasks by calling 
the agent to account. At the end of the accountability chain are the citizens, who pass judgement 
on the conduct of the government and who indicate their displeasure by voting for other popular 
representatives.’6 This would mean that administrative accountability is a part of the more gen-
eral (public) accountability chain.  
 
It is understandable that transparency and accountability are sometimes used as synonyms. Even 
though the terms are not synonymous, they are related. Bovens argues that transparency could be 
seen as a prerequisite for accountability.7 However, looking at the above reasoning, we can pose 
that administrative accountability is also meant to enhance transparency: ‘it provides the people’s 
representation and the voters with the information needed for judging the propriety and effective-
ness of the conduct of the government’.8 What we then expect is that ‘an accountability arrange-
ment or regime enables democratically legitimised bodies to monitor and evaluate executive be-




4 Bovens, M. , 2007, p. 450. 
5 Bovens, M. , 2007, p. 462. 
6 Bovens, M. , 2007, p. 463. 
7 Bovens, M. , 2007, p. 453. 
8 Bovens, M. , 2007, p. 463. 
9 Bovens, M. , 2007, p. 465. 
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These arrangements are not always in place. In most developed countries accountability problems 
have emerged, as a result of shifting powers. As Schillemans and Busuioc describe, often respon-
sibilities have shifted away from the state, toward third parties, such as networks and private or-
ganisations. In those cases, the state is limited to control those organisations and networks, ‘creat-
ing gaps in systems of accountability’.10 These shifts thus result in an accountability deficit. On 
the other hand shifting of powers can also result in an accountability excess.11 Accountability 
excess mostly appears in situations whereby an organisation is accountable to various organisa-
tions. However, accountability excess also appears in cases in which more than one organisation 
is held accountable for the same or a similar policy. 
 
The Netherlands School of Public Administration published a discussion on this overlapping re-
sponsibility. The paper describes various ways accountability excess can be tackled. On the one 
hand, boundaries can be defined more clearly, ensuring that the overlap becomes nonexistent. 
This could be done up front by the legislator, or during the implementation, through court deci-
sions. On the other hand, if the boundaries stay vague, the actors involved will find solutions for 
the problems they encounter.12 This could be so when a clear distinction is made between the role 
of the accountable, and the one that is accounted.  
 
In summary, accountability can increase transparency, when it is clear who can be held accounta-
ble for what and by whom. Therefore, in order to understand whether the newly introduced sys-
tem of Youth Care in the Netherlands is transparent, it is important to know how the system 
works. In the next paragraphs we assess whether or not the new introduced system of youth care 
is transparent by analysing the legal framework and the working of this framework in practice. 
 
3. Legal framework  
Supervision is an important element in the new Act on Youth Care. A closer look at this new Act 
reveals that there are two types of supervision present. The first one focuses on the achievements 
of the municipalities and is done by the State. The second one focuses on the actors in the field of 
the youth care, such as health visitors, and is done by three different national inspectorates. In a 
certain way this type of supervision is also done by the State since these inspectorates need to act 
according to instructions of the responsible Minister. In this paragraph, the legal framework of 
supervision in the new Act on Youth Care is discussed. 
3.1 State supervision 
Municipalities are responsible for almost all the youth care ranging from managing health visitors 
to make sure enough places are available for children in specialised care facilities. The State, and 
more specific the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment or the Minister of Security and Jus-
                                                            
10 Schillemans, T., M. Busuioc, 2014, ‘Predicting public sector accountability: from agency drift to forum drift’, 
Journal of public administration research and theory, 25 (1), pp. 192. 
11 NSOB, 2016, De som en de delen. In gesprek over systeemverantwoordelijkheid.  
12 NSOB, 2016. 
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tice supervise the municipalities. In situations when a serious shortcoming is ascertained the 
competent Minister can intervene based on the provisions on supervision in the Local Govern-
ment Act (in Dutch: Gemeentewet).13 According to the Local Government Act, the Minister can 
use the instrument of full representation (in Dutch: indeplaatsstelling), meaning that the Minister 
can replace decisions of the municipality executive with his one decisions. This means for in-
stance that the Minister can draft a policy plan or make sure enough places are available in certi-
fied institutions. The municipality has to pay for costs made by the Minister. This instrument 
should only be used as a last resort and when other, informal, options are not effective.  
Although this supervision is based on general rules laid down in the Local Government Act, use 
is made of an exception laid down in article 124b of this Act. According to the general rule, laid 
down in article 124 of the Local Government Act, supervision of local authorities is done by the 
authority that is, from a hierarchal point of view, the most nearby (in Dutch: nabijheidsbeginsel), 
which in this case would be the provincial executive. Instead, the Minister of Security and Justice 
or the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment is appointed.14 In the explanatory memoran-
dum it is stated by the legislator that use is made of this exception due to the fact the provincial 
executive is not suitable to supervise the mayor and municipal executive since the province, due 
to the shift in responsibilities, no longer has expertise in the field of Youth Care.15  
3.2 Supervision and enforcement by Inspectorates 
Actors in the field of Youth Care, such as the health visitor or certified institutions of Youth Care, 
are supervised as well. This is done by three national inspectorates: the Inspectorate of Public 
Order and Safety, the Inspectorate of Health Care and the Inspectorate for Youth Care. All three 
inspectorates have different responsibilities. According to article 9.1 (1) of the Act on Youth 
Care, the Inspectorate of Youth Care is responsible for supervising the general quality of the giv-
en care by different actors, such as certified institutions, the Child Care and Protection Board and 
local ‘Safe at Home’ branches and compliance with the new Act on Youth Care. The Inspectorate 
of Public Order and Safety supervises decisions on criminal matters, for instance the implementa-
tion of decisions issued by criminal court, such as the placement of children into care.16 The in-
spectorate of Health Care is responsible for supervising compliance with the new Act on Youth 
Care of the Public Health Services, Health Visitors and youth care for mentally handicapped 
children.17 
One of the questions that needs answering is what the relation between these inspectorates exact-
ly is. In the Act on Youth Care the inspectorates of Youth Care and Public Order and Safety are 
                                                            
13 Article 24 Local Government Act 
14 Annex I Local Government Act 
15 Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, p. 26. 
16 Article 9.1 (2) Act on Youth Care 
17 This supervision is not based upon provisions in the Act on Youth Care but on three other Dutch Acts: de Wet 
Bijzondere opneming in psychiatrische ziekenhuizen, de Kwaliteitswet zorginstellingen en de Wet op Beroepen in de 
Individuele Gezondheidszorg. See also Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, p. 60, Parliamentary Papers 
2013-2014, 33 684, No. 10, p. 111.  
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explicitly mentioned in article 9.1 as well as their responsibilities, but the inspectorate of Health 
Care is not mentioned in this article but in other Acts. In the parliamentary papers, including the 
explanatory memorandum it is stated that this inspectorate is responsible, together with the in-
spectorate of Youth Care, for supervising compliance with the Act.18 What this exactly entails, is 
not made clear. It is stated in the parliamentary papers is that these inspectorates do coordinate 
their actions. In practice, they have set up an inspection centre for Youth (in Dutch: Inspectielo-
ket Jeugd voor Gemeenten) that municipalities can consult if they have any questions regarding 
the supervision of actors in the field of Youth Care. This centre is also used by the inspections to 
communicate with the municipalities.19 Besides this front office, these three inspectorates togeth-
er with the Inspectorate of Education and the Inspectorate of Social Affairs and Employment 
have formed an association (in Dutch: Samenwerkend Toezicht Jeugd/Sociaal Domein). It is not 
clear what the exact status of this association exactly is. Would this type of cooperation fail at a 
certain point, the Act on Youth Care provides for the option that additional rules on coordination 
are laid down in a Ministerial Act.20 As for so far, no rules are laid down. 
The inspectorates do not only supervise actors but are also responsible for the enforcement of 
measures if no progress is made or if the quality of Youth Care or the safety of a child is at stake. 
There are different instruments of enforcement available for the inspectorates: administrative 
measures, such as an administrative fine, criminal measures and disciplinary measures.21 All 
measures are imposed by the Minister. 
The inspectorates should act according to instructions of the Minister (article 9.1 (4)). But they 
also have to cater for the wishes of the municipalities (article 9.1. (5)). Municipalities can make 
their wishes clear before the yearly working programme is set up but can also ask for ad hoc su-
pervision.22 
3.3 System responsibility 
The State is also, according to the explanatory memorandum, responsible for the system of Youth 
Care. What this responsibility exactly entails, does not become quite clear. No reference is made 
in the Act to this type of responsibility as such and the explanation provided by the parliamentary 
papers is not clear at all. For instance, in the explanatory memorandum no other explanation is 
provided than that the State needs to make sure all the necessary preconditions are in place and 
that they stimulate innovation.23 In answers provided by the Minister to questions of political 
parties during the legislative process, the Minister stated that this system responsibility entails 
that the State can be held responsible for social outcome of the Act on Youth Care. The State is 
responsible for a transparent judicial and financial framework and creating all the necessary pre-
conditions. According to the Minister the State should engage in at least the following activities: 
                                                            
18 Parliamentary Papers, 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, p. 60-61, Parliamentary Papers, 2013-2014, No. 10, p. 111.  
19 See https://www.jeugdinspecties.nl/wiezijnwij/?id=58 
20 Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, pp. 60-61. 
21 Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, pp. 60-61, Article 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6 Act on Youth Care. 
22 Parliamentary Papers 2012-2014, 33 684, No. 3, p. 61. 
23 Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 33 684, No. 3, pp. 5-6. 
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meetings with the Dutch Association of Municipalities (in Dutch: Vereniging voor Nederlandse 
Gemeenten) and other relevant parties in the field of youth care, stimulation of innovation and 
quality, supervision by the Inspectorates, the use of monitoring instruments, the evaluation of the 
Act on Youth Care every five years, and monitoring and adjustments, if needed, of the judicial 
and financial framework.24 Interestingly enough, some activities, such as adjustment of the judi-
cial and financial framework, are based on legislative powers of the legislator. The same can be 
said for the evaluation of the Act every five years, which simply can be found in article 12.2 of 
this Act (and in fact is every three years) and the possibility of supervision by Inspectorates, 
which can be found in chapter 9 of this Act.  
This leaves the question open why the legislator explicitly makes the State responsible for the 
system when it does not become clear what this exactly entails. In literature it is stated that this 
concept of system responsibility seems to be used by the State in situations where responsibilities 
are decentralised to municipalities or provinces but the State still wants to keep tabs on munici-
palities and provinces although from a legal perspective they only have their legislative powers 
and the possibility of supervision.25 
4. The framework in practice  
The juridical analysis shows the Act and the explanatory memorandum are unclear on various 
aspects of the role of the accountable, and the one that is accounted. We have encountered the 
emergence of a possible accountability excess. There seems to be accountability excess whereby 
more than one organisation is held accountable for the same or a similar policy. The accountabil-
ity excess can be tackled if the actors involved find solutions for the problems they encounter. In 
order to analyse the working of the system in practice we conducted an explorative field study 
(interviews). The results are discusses in this paragraph. 
4.1 System responsibility 
To start, let us look at a definition of system responsibility of the ministry of Internal Affairs, the 
ministry that has an overall system responsibility. According to this ministry, system responsibil-
ity means that the minister is responsible for the functioning of the system as such, while others 
are responsible for the results of the system. In order to ensure the responsibility for the system, 
the minister checks through supervision whether the various actors comply with the prerequisites 
(1), the state provides juridical norms (2), the ministry supports the implementation of actors (3) 
and when the administrative system becomes weak, the minister intervenes (4).26 In other words, 
the state does not only monitor the working of the system and the results, it also shapes policy by 
trying to ensure the right parameters are put in place. In the following paragraph, the various re-
sponsibilities are explored in more detail.  
                                                            
24 Parliamentary Papers 2013-2014, 33 684, No. 10, p. 9 
25 S.A.J. Munneke, ‘Maatwerk, gelijkheid, zeggenschap,’ in: G.J. Vonk (red.), Rechtstatelijke aspecten van de decen-
tralisaties in het sociale domein, Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Vakgroep Bestuursrecht en Bestuurskunde 
2016, p. 93-96. 
26 NSOB, 2016, p 14 
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4.2 Guiding policy formation 
The local authorities are responsible for the formulation of their local youth care. The State has 
tried to facilitate the local authorities in this task. During the transition from provinces to munici-
palities, the Transition agency Youth provided information, to facilitate municipalities with the 
upcoming decentralisation. Now that the transition has concluded, the Association of Netherlands 
municipalities has taken up the task to provide this type of information to the local authorities. 
Also the Netherlands Youth Institute, the Dutch national institute for compiling, verifying and 
disseminating knowledge on children and youth matters, provides information that can be used 
for policy formation. The Transition Authority Youth provides help with the agreements between 
municipalities and care providers, while the inspectorate for youth care decides on the quality 
standards it uses to check the care institutions. This influences the local authorities for two rea-
sons. First, the quality standards of the inspectorate are automatically the minimum standards of 
the authorities. Second, since local authorities mostly rely on local care providers, the institutions 
can demand more funding, when local authorities rely on them, but they need more funding to be 
able to fulfil the standards.  
4.2 Supervising the implementation 
The local authorities or more specific the executives, are responsible for the execution of their 
youth care policy and the municipal councils have the responsibility to supervise the policy mak-
ing and implementation of policy. The ministries monitor the progress, in order to determine 
whether municipalities have structural problems and the solutions can be found within the legal 
framework.  
There are various ways to monitor whether the system functions correctly. First and foremost, 
there are various monitors, that are meant to be used by the municipalities to compare the quality 
of the youth care with other municipalities. However, for example the monitor executed by Sta-
tistics Netherlands, is also used to determine whether the ministry of HWS will want to take up 
certain issues. 
Besides the monitors, there are other ways to stay informed about the functioning of the system. 
For instance, the work of the inspectorates can be used as a monitor. The Inspectorate for youth 
care checks whether care institutions fulfil necessary quality standards. Independent institutions, 
such as the Ombudsman for Children, can raise awareness of problems in the system. Media cov-
erage can also raise questions, that can cause members of parliament or of local councils to ask 
questions about the care provided.  
Based upon the monitoring, the ministry can decide to act. According to the ministry of HWS a 
more active approach of system responsibility is chosen for the first years, when the transition 
from provinces to municipalities and the transformation of the policy making process is in pro-




Both the ministry of S&J and the ministry of HWS advocate that their approach is an informal 
one. When an issue has arisen, they will contact a municipality informally, in order to gain more 
information. They will try to settle the matter in an informal way. Only when needed, they will 
intensify and formalise the approach, including a request for an official meeting between the min-
istry and the local executive.  
Through this approach, several issues have been discussed at the ministries. Examples are deal-
ings with administrative costs, waiting lists, the transition from 18 year olds to other care sys-
tems, specialised youth care and the transformation itself. When issues are brought to the table, 
the ministries need to decide whether it is a task of the ministry to solve the problem or not. We 
will give two examples of issues that have come up, to demonstrate in what way the ministries 
can deal with issues when they decide it is their responsibility. 
Bankruptcy care facilities 
Local authorities contract care providers to provide the necessary and desired care. The introduc-
tion of contracting is based on the assumption that competition will encourage care facilities to 
offer the highest quality of care, against the lowest possible price. It stimulates authorities to 
make clear choices in what kind of care provision they want and to choose the care provider with 
the best offer. This system seems to work well, when voluntary care is on offer. It is problematic 
for the organisation of specialised care. By definition, specialised services are only needed occa-
sionally. Individual local authorities often cannot foresee the need for specific care. In this pris-
oners dilemma, individual municipalities will not contract specialised care providers, therefore 
preventing the continuation of care. This would mean that when a municipality needs the care, it 
would either not be on offer, or it would be extremely expensive. For certain types of care, this 
scale problem even arises when local authorities organise themselves in an intermunicipal part-
nership to facilitate the acquisition of care on a regional level. In this case, the ministries have 
ensured that the Association of Netherlands Municipalities employ staff to let municipalities or-
ganise specialised care in a supraregional manner. Also the Transition Authority Youth provides 
help with the agreements between municipalities and care providers. The authority also advises 
the ministries on possible support for care facilities facing high friction costs.  
Privacy 
Up until august 2015 no personal data about youth could be shared between the care providers 
and the local authorities. Since no information was shared, municipalities had no way to verify 
the legality of the invoices the care providers sent the authorities. In April 2015 Minister Van 
Rijn announced a temporary regulation on personal data on invoices.27 According to Van Rijn, 
the temporary regulation enables the local authorities to handle and check the invoices, whilst 
safeguarding the privacy of the clients.  
                                                            






4.3 Separation of responsibilities 
There seems to be a distinction between child care on one hand and child protection and rehabili-
tation on the other. Not only are these two policy areas split between two ministries (system re-
sponsibility for child care lies with the ministry of HWS and the system responsibility for child 
protection and rehabilitation lies with the ministry of S&J), also the consequences for failure 
within the area of child protection and rehabilitation are more severe, therefore making risk less 
acceptable. In practice it means that local authorities can make policy for voluntary care, includ-
ing prevention, but they have little to say when compulsory treatment is regarded necessary. In 
those cases, social workers of the municipality identify a problematic situation and ask the Child 
Care and Protection Board to investigate the matter. Based on an advise of the board, the juvenile 
court decided on treatment, which is executed by a certified facility, and paid for by the munici-
pality.  
Another distinction can be made between generic and specialised care (whereby we include com-
pulsory care in specialised care). Local authorities have more freedom to develop and execute 
generic care on their own, whilst they have an obligation to provide specialised care in inter-
municipal partnerships. For highly specialised care, a greater number of municipalities are in-
cluded in a partnership, than for when less specialised care. A higher number of municipalities, 
decreases the possibilities of the council to fulfil its monitoring and supervising tasks. In other 
words, partnerships enable the municipalities to provide the necessary care, but they also make it 
more difficult to monitor and supervise the execution of care. It becomes proportionately more 
difficult to monitor and supervise the execution of care, when the number of participating munic-
ipalities increases.  
Figure 1 represents the working of the care system in practise, whereby the separation between 
generic and specialised care is shown, just like the distinction between voluntary (youth care) and 











































Figure 1. System and executive structure youth care Netherlands 
5. Concluding remarks 
The Act on Youth Care was introduced in order increase the transparency of the system of youth 
care. In this paper we explored whether these ambitions were fulfilled. The theory shows trans-
parency can be enhanced when responsibilities are clearly defined, since this enables to hold the 
responsible actors accountable. This can be done, either through clear legislation or through prac-
tical solutions by the actors confronted with the unclear responsibilities. In this paper, we have 
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concluded that at first sight, the Act does not define responsibilities in a clear way. For instance 
what entails the system responsibility of the State and what consequences does this have for the 
different actors, such as municipalities? And what is the exact relation between the Inspectorates? 
Do they have to work together when sharing responsibility for fields of youth care? However, the 
actors involved do not seem to have a problem in clearly distinguishing responsibilities.  
Thus, the system definitely looks complicated: there are several types of system responsibility 
and several types of executive responsibility. However, in practise we see a clear separation be-
tween these various responsibilities. The main distinction to be made is that between the type of 
care provided. We could argue there is a kind of continuum, between voluntary preventive care 
on one side, and highly specialised or compulsory care on the other. When care is compulsory or 
more specialised, the local authority has little responsibility over policy creation and implementa-
tion. The central authority influences policy making in an early stage, through various inspec-
torates, directives and instructions. It also monitors the process and the outcome of the policies. 
However, when care is voluntary, the municipality is almost solely responsible for the creation 
and execution. The State does monitor the execution through various sources. Though, it will 
only respond when potential problems are thought to be structural failures that need to be tackled 
through legislation. 
The responsibilities seem to be clear. Also, the State and the local authorities have various ways 
to monitor the processes and the outcomes. This means it is possible to notice whether something 
goes wrong. However, whether the right authorities can be held accountable depends on the as-
sumption a clear distinction can be made between the execution of policy and the working of the 
system. When it is an incident, the local executive should be held accountable by its local coun-
cil. When it is a structural problem, the State should account for its actions. Is it possible to de-
termine whether a problem this is an incident or whether it is a failure of the structure?  
Youth care is a sensitive topic. Therefore members of parliament and local councils could re-
spond quickly on media coverage on incidents in youth care. This raises awareness of incidents, 
which in turn could indicate structural failures of the system. It depends on the reaction of the 
executives whether they account for issues they are responsible for or not. Even though this dis-
tinction is not made clear in the Act or any other documents, we have not found any indication 
that there are problems making this distinction. For one, we have found no indication of a risk 
regulation reflex, which you can expect when the State would respond to an incident. This sug-
gests that responsibilities are clearly defined in practice, and the responsible one can be held ac-
countable. This should therefore enable the transparency of the system. We would therefore pre-
dict that parliament will hold government accountable when structural problems appear and local 
councils will hold their executives accountable regarding the functioning of youth care within 
their municipality.  
Regarding the latter, the functioning of this system is hindered because of the intermunicipal 
partnerships that are created to execute most of the specialised and compulsory care. Local coun-
13 
 
cils seem to struggle to control these partnerships. The structure is clear and they have the tools, 
but somehow the created distance makes it hard to supervise the execution of the policy making. 
Also, as Schillemans and Busuioc argue, some principals ‘fall short in their monitoring roles’.28 
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